THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: THE BILATERAL RELATION

 As always happens when there is a change of administration, discussions on current policies, whether national or international, are reopened in search of adjustments or new definitions. This always invites those who have a political, economic or ideological interest in redefining the course of a policy to get involved in the debate with a view to change it. It is normal. The projection of the United States towards Cuba has always been a good example to this rule.

This memorandum summarizes in a very concise way the documented analysis of more than sixty pages that we have written and is already available (in Spanish) on this subject. We hope that it will serve as a positive contribution to the conversation around the bilateral relationship with Cuba.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 

1. It is necessary to understand a problem to then solve it. Cuba is no longer a revolutionary or communist state in the classical sense. In Cuba, the military power elite is in command; the government of Miguel Díaz-Canel administers and obeys. In alliance with the Venezuelan narco-dictatorship, this elite has built a post-communist mafia state within the old bureaucratic state. The power elite monopolizes the military and foreign relations institutions and all companies that generate dollars under a holding company (GAE S.A.). Nobody can control their actions and finances. Its logic is purely commercial. Services to and social security for the population have been neglected but the old bureaucratic state continues to respond for them without resources or profitable institutions. Negotiating with “the government” without obtaining guarantees from the power elite - whose core is the Castro family and a group of military and civilians close to it - will not lead to a stable transformation of the bilateral relationship. 

2. US policy should not be state-focused and should distinguish and prioritize the bilateral relationship with the Cuban people vs that with the power elite. Both tracks of the bilateral relationship must develop at different tempos. The relationship with the population must be direct and immediate. On the other hand, the government relations with the Cuban State must be developed, as per Raúl Castro’s dictum, “with no pause, but with no haste either”.

 The real possibility of a US rapprochement with Cuba must have a well-defined primary objective: to build and promote better relations between the US government and the Cuban people.  

3. It is necessary that Washington should give guarantees to Cubans that they will have the support of the United States in order to achieve a luminous future in the short term if they fight and transform the current system into an open, democratic, market society in which human rights are respected. And that they will also have the support of the US in that fight for democracy and human rights within the framework of international law.
4. Cubans know that the current system condemns them to backwardness, that the government is responsible for their dire situation, but they still doubt whether they will be able to achieve a better future if the situation changes. The United States can and must help them overcome their skepticism. The Cuba people should know that to achieve this future in the short term they can count on the United States. Prosperity is at hand if Cubans transform the system. The first step in this transformation process must be the lifting of the internal blockade on the development of the genuinely private, rural and urban sector, which is not sanctioned by the Helms Burton Act. On the other hand, while the Helms Burton Act is in force, the normalization of a full relationship with the Cuban State may not take place until the requirements codified in that Law are met, including the holding of pluralistic, free and internationally supervised elections. 

5. Without a radical systemic transformation, no external help will save the situation. The Cuban model does not work, it is in crisis and it is irreformable. This situation creates ungovernability, which is expressed in internal conflict and migratory pressures. This crisis is the responsibility of the Cuban military power elite. The primary responsibility for putting an end to that state of affairs rests with all Cubans.
6. The current situation is going to get worse. No credit granted to Cuba without first carrying out a genuine systemic reform will ever be paid, nor will its interests be honored. Thanks to the Obama Administration, Cuba was able to renegotiate its debt with the Paris Club, which canceled 42 billion in debt and extended the remaining payment until 2033. But as Cuba did not implement systemic reforms, it fell back into the black hole of debt. Cuba paid neither its debt nor the interests that had been renegotiated with the Paris Club in October 2019 and the latter has imposed a penalty of 9% interest on the balance. Cuba also defaulted on its renegotiated debt with Russia, which suspended its investment projects in December 2020, and China has just done the same. That has always been the behavior of Havana with respect to its foreign debt in six decades. According to economists, it is expected that under these conditions the fiscal deficit in 2021 will increase to 23.3%, the highest since the 1990s.
   If private loans were granted that Cuba would not pay, the creditors would end up declaring bankruptcies in the face of defaults and the taxpayers' money would go to subsidize the Cuban military power elite. That is unacceptable.
7. Hasty and unilateral concessions should not be made to the power elite. The result would be that it would continue to cling to a system that oppresses Cubans and plunges them into destitution. What makes sense to prioritize is direct support to the people so that they can put pressure on the government and get it to undertake the necessary transformations towards freedom and prosperity.

 RECOMMENDATIONS   

1. The Cuban people should be clearly informed by Washington that once the internal blockade by the Cuban government is fully lifted, their sector of genuinely private farmers and entrepreneurs will be able to interact directly with the US economy. This would translate into the creation of thousands of businesses offering products and services, thus dodging famine with an abundance of food products and creating millions of jobs for the unemployed and underemployed. 

2. Three circumstances are required to resume and advance bilateral relations:
3. Respect for basic human and labor rights. Among them is the immediate cessation – de facto and de jure - of repressing freedom of opinion, expression, press, academia, association, demonstration; the end of trafficking and exploitation of forced labor of Cuban professionals and doctors, and freedom for political prisoners. 

1. The complete elimination of the internal blockade on the development of the farmers and urban entrepreneurial sector, including free access without intermediaries for the incipient Cuban private sector to credits, foreign investment and international trade, the legal registration of their lands and businesses, and the freedom to set prices for their products and services as required by the market.
2. The withdrawal of support by Cuban military and intelligence personnel to the Venezuelan narco-dictatorship.

None of the above requires a decision from Washington. All are in the hands of Cuba and within the purview of international human rights conventions signed by Havana. The first two would contribute to initiating a transformation of the governance regime that would immediately alleviate internal conflicts, avoid famine, make it easier for the US to interact with the private sector, even if sanctions remain, and help it improve living conditions on the island. All this would result in a decrease in Cuban migratory pressure. The third would be an important step to demonstrate Cuba's willingness to distance itself from other state and non-state actors involved in criminal and subversive activities in the region. Supporting a criminal narco-dictatorship is not an exercise in sovereignty. Without this step, it would be arbitrary to force Cuba out of the list of countries associated with terrorism again.

Cuba should be the one this time to initiate, facilitate and provide reasons for a rapprochement between the two countries, not the United States.